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STATENENT OF SENA'roR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
A T!ITRD HAY ON BERLIN 
THU JUN 15 1961 AM 
Mr. Presi dent: 
As anticipated by the President, the talks in Vienna did not 
produce any significant change in the situation at Berlin . Strip the 
newspaper accounts of their sensationalism and one thing is clear: The 
situation in Berlin is where it was in the fall of 1958. It is unchanged 
despite the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1959. It is un-
changed despite the friendly meeting at Camp David in 1959 and the furious 
meeting in Paris in the aftermath of the U-2 incident . There were no 
spirits at Vienna, only the hard facts exchanged without embellishment . 
There was only a high degree of soberness coupled with the personal 
courtesy of leaders, without which nations cannot hope to find a way to 
peace, today, any better than when diplomacy first began . 
In this sense the Vienna t~lks were useful . They swept away the 
chaff. They revealed to both Mr. Khrushchev and Mr . Kennedy the hard kernel 
of the problem. They revealed, too, that the problem confronts us in sub-
stantially the same form as it did when it first appeared more than two 
years ago . 
I suppose, Mr . President, we may regard the fact that the situa-
tion in Berlin is unchanged after two years, that the crisis has been post-
poned for two years, as some sort of achievement. In early 1959, a military 
showdown appeared imminent to me, as it did to most observers, unless the 
poli c i es and attitudes of a decade and a half would begin to change. The 
showdown did not take place. It was forestalled by an almost continuous 
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round of sub-summit and summit conferences and visitings back and forth 
and hither and yon. The crisis has stirred again from time to time during 
the past two years bu~ it has not erupted. Because it has not does not 
mean that it will not. If the present positions of the parties concerned 
remain unchanged, sooner or later, this crisis postponed, this crisis 
avoided will cease to lie dormant. 
~fuat is involved at Berlin is not some obscure situation, distant 
from our concern or the concern of the Soviet Union. Berlin is at the core 
of these concerns. Berlin is the lever which may ease Europe towards a more 
durable security or push the Western nations and the Soviet Union into a new 
vortex of irrationality at whose center lies the graveyard of humanity. 
In these circumstances, we owe it to ourselves to examine the 
position which we have assumed with respect to Berlin. The leaders of the 
Soviet Union are obligated to do the same. Both sides owe it to the people 
of the world. The responsibility which we have, Mr. President, and which 
the Soviet Union has, is not merely to reassert positions already assumed 
and which are obviously irreconcilable. The responsibility is to seek to 
determine whether or not there is a third way on Berlin which corresponds 
more accurately to the needs of Germany today, Europe today and the world 
today--indeed, a thi~d way which meets more fully the contemporary needs 
of both the Soviet Union and ourselves. 
vle can make this exploration only if we see clearly what the 
present positions are and what they imply. 
Together with Britain and France this nation is pledged to main-
tain an allied presence in vlest Berlin and to defend the people of that 
half-city. The other members of N.A.T.O. have endorsed this position. 
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I do not think there is any misunderstanding of what we are 
pledged to do, either at. home or abroad. Nevertheless, let us restate 
the position to be certain that it is not misunderstood either at home 
or abroad. Let us restate it without provocation, without bombast. Let 
us restate it, as I am sure the President did at Vienna, in all soberness: 
\-le ,.,ill not be driven, pushed or barred from fulfilling our responsibili-
ties to ourselves and to freedom in Berlin by any nation, half-nation, 
S[OUP of nations or whatever. Such measures as may be necessary to assert 
that responsibility will be taken. 
This is what we say in the phrase: Stand firm at Berlin. The 
full implications of these four words had better be understood in this 
Senate, in this Congress and throughout the nation. They had better be 
understood now. The range of this commitment extends from a 'beginning of 
words of firmness, to a midpoint of expenditure of immense resources and 
enormous taxes and other sacrificeG, to a final pledge of the lives and 
fortunes of every man, woman and child in the nation. We are not engaged 
at Berlin with the fast draw and wax bullets of television anymore than 
the Russians are engaged in a harmless game of chess. In the last analysis 
we are engaged now, as we have been at Berlin, with the whole future of the 
United States. In this day and age and in this situation, the words, stand-
ing nrm, carry no other than this ultj_mate implication. 
I say this, Mr. President, with no desire to disturb the serenity 
of the Senate. I say it only that we may be clear on the meaning of the 
words we use. I say it in order that we may comprehend more accurately 
the immense burden which rests on the shoulders of the President of the 
United States. He will make the decisions and he must make them in this 
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awesome context. I trust and I am confident that those of us with public 
responsibilities--in government and out and particularly the press and 
other news media--will remain cognizant of this burden during the next 
few months. 
Let me set forth next, Mr. President, my understanding of the 
position to which the Soviet Union adheres in the Berlin situation. It 
is, so far as I am aware, unchanged as is ours, except in time-schedule 
since it was first announced in November 1958. I should like to state 
that position in substance, without se~sationalism and as objectively as 
I can delineate it from the accounts which have appeared in the press. 
The Soviet Union intends to withdraw from its vlorld War II occupational 
re8ponsibilities in East Berlin and it insists that the Western powers 
must do the same in vleet Berlin. It proposes to turn over East Berlin 
to the East German authorities, presumably as part of a separate peace 
treaty with the East German government. It offers to join in a guarantee 
of a new status for West Berlin as a free city within that state. And if 
I am not mistaken, Mr. ICarushchev has added to this position a further 
contention that the Soviet Union will come to the military aid of the East 
German authorities in the event that the Western powers refuse to accept 
this change and continue to assert their present responsibilities in West 
Berlin in opposition to the ''lishes of those authorities. 
These two positions, then, form the substance of the Berlin 
crisis now dormant but which, at any time, may become active. We insist, 
in effect, on the continuance of the status quo in Berlin for the present 
and, presumably until such time as Germany is unified. The Russians are 
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intent upon changing the status quo in a particular fashion in the near 
futu~e, regardless of the eventual solution of the question of German uni-
fication. 
I know that we intend to mai.ntain our position. I do not lightly 
assume that the Soviet Premier does not mean what he says with respect to 
the position of the Soviet Union, despite the postponements of the actual 
act of Soviet withdrawal during the months and years since November 1959. 
My own view of this situation, however, is not one which depends 
on whether the Soviet Premier means what he says or does not mean what he 
says. It is based upon my personal estimate of the changing situation in 
Europe and. the 1.;orld and it is based upon what I believe to be the rational 
interests of this nation in the light of those changes, 
I have long questioned and I continue to question a status quo 
which places us in the position, in effect, of pleading with or urging 
the Russians not to withdraw their military forces from the Westernmost 
point of penetration which they reached in Europe in the wake of World 
War II; yet, our present position on Berlin requires that we do precisely 
that. Further, Mr. PTesident, I do not think we can safeguard most ef-
fectively our o·..m interests or advance the interests of peace when we 
insist upon remaining directly under a communist sword of Damocles, as 
is now the case in Berlin, if a rational alternative may be found to that 
position through diplomacy. Further, Mr. President, I have long questioned 
and I continue to question a position on Berlin which was assumed immediately 
after World War II and has been maintained unchanged despite the enormous 
changes which have occurred in both parts of Germany and in Europe since 
that time. Finally, I question, as I have long questioned, a position 
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which, through subordinate irresponsibility, error or provocation on either 
side invites the precipitation of a nuclear conflict. 
We prove our courage. our steadfastness, our determination when 
we insist, as insist we must with all that insistance implies, that we 
shall not p~.::mi t the Russians or anyone else to dictate unilaterally the 
terms under which this nation and i~s allies shall discharge the responsi-
bilities which were assumed in Berlin in the wake of vTorld War II. We 
~ould prove li-ttle more than the inertia of Western leadership, however, 
if we insist that the status quo in Berlin is sacronsanct. We prove little 
more than the sterility of our diplomacy if we insist that the status quo 
at BerUn cannot be <:_banged even by mutual agreement leading to a new 
sj_tuation, which is neither that which nm• exists nor the alternative 
which the Soviet Union propou.r .. ds. It seems to~Mr. President, that if 
w;e are to be not merely courageous but iutelligently courageous that is 
precisely the course we must pursue , We must seek a third way in Berlin 
which may better serve the j.nterests of all the parties concerneC.--of the 
German people no less than other Eurc:..,~uns, of the Uni tee. States no less 
than the Soviet U':lion and of that great stretch of the -vmrld with its 
hundreds of millions of people to whom Berlin is but a name if it is even 
that. 
I would not vrish to preclude, Mr. President, any proposals to 
this end which may originate in any quarter. Indeed, it would be helpful, 
in my opinion, if the Senate discussed this matter at length. I suggest, 
moreover, that this discussion might profitably begin now before the 
relatively dormant crisis in Berlin ccmes alive once again. We can think 
now of its many implications with a measure of detachment and deliberation. 
If we wait for the moment of h~at, it may be too late to think at all. 
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I repeat, Mr. President, I do not wish to preclude any ideas or 
proposals, regardless of their source, which may promise a rational solu-
tion of the problem of Berlin. For my part, however, I believe that the 
third way lies in an honest recognition of the fact that it is too late in 
the ge.me to expect that Germany will be reunified in peace by fiat of the 
United States, France, Great Britain and Soviet Russia as was expected 15 
years ago. Yet, this assumption continues to underlie our position with 
respect to Berlin. If the assumption is invalid, then the continued 
garrisoning of Berlin by the forces of these four nations loses much of 
its significance as a temporary occupational measure ~mich was ~11 it was 
intended to be when these garrisons ~rere established a decade and a half 
ago. 
However, Berlin--not just West Berlin but all Berlin--d.oes not 
lose its significance in terms of ultimate German unif~cation. Ber~in 
remains the symbolic hope of that un~fication and I do not think it is 
unreasonable to assume that it will one day again be the actual capital 
of a unified Germany. It seems to me that the German people will have 
the best opportu~ity to find the way to unification in peace and the out-
side powers will make a significant contribution to the search, if they 
will act now to r~move Berlin--all Berlin--from the clashes of the cold 
war into which it has baen driven by the events of the post-war years. 
If we must live, as it now seems likely, for an indefinite period 1v.Lth 
a divided Germany, then, peace requi:-es that Berlin--all Berlin--be held 
in peace and in trust until the day of unification. Its status must be 
reconstituted so that Berlin wj_ll be the hope for peaceful German unifica-
tion rather than the prize for German unification by ot~er means which it 
has now become . 
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This conversion of Berlin will not occur under Mr. Khrushchev's 
proposal to turn only Hest Be:::-Hn into a free city. Even if the rights 
of the Western ;preBence to that half-city were insu-red beyond a shaa.ow 
of doubt, even if gue.rantees of the safety of the vlestern enclave were 
inviolata, it ~oes not s~em to me that this arrangement would be satis-
factory. For it would reduce this enclave to a sleepy quasi-foreign 
anachronism au_?. it would leave Berlin--symbolic Berlin, unifying Berlin, 
Capital Berlin, German Berlin--in ~he hands of a militant German minority. 
It would give an enormous and inadmissible amplification th-roughout 
Germany to the present small voice of the East German minority government 
at Pankow, It would invite German nationalism throughout Germany to adhere 
to the German communist standard flyi~g in East Berlin. That is a handicap 
which freedom cannot a~low. It is a concession which does not accord with 
the need.s o:f:' ;peace ~!?- Ge-rmany or the essentials of ;peaceful com;peti tion 
bet\-reen communism and freedom. 
I do not believe, Mr. President, that the way to ;peace can be 
found either in the maintenance of the status quo in Berlin or in the 
change which 1'1.1!'. Khrushchev proposes. A third Vlay may lie in the creation 
of a free c~ not in West Barlin alone but in the creation of a free city 
which embraces all Berlin--the comm.;.mist east no less than the free western 
segment of ~hat met:::-opolis. Let this whole city be held in trust and in 
peace by some international autho~ity until such time as it is again the 
capital of Germany. Let the routes of access to this whole city be gar-
risoned by in.t ernational peace teams in the effective pattern of those 
now operating between Israel a-r.d the Arab States. Let this interim status 
of free city be guaranteed by the N.A.T.O. and Warsaw pa.ct cmmtries. Let 
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Bonn and Pankow s~bscrioe to this arrangement and pay its costs in appro-
priate shares . Let these changes be incorporated in specific written 
agreements. Then, perhaps, we may have the beginning of a durable peace 
in Berlin and the healing of the cleavage in Germany and Europe. 
I l~now, Mr. President, that to bring about this change in Berlin 
after the division of that city has hardened over many years may seem an 
immensely difficult, political and diplomatic undertaking. But is it not, 
really, an infinitestimal task when compared with the full implications of 
an essay in military solution with what comes after it? 
I realize, too, Mr. President, that this approach may evoke no 
response from~.fr. Khrushchev. But Cl.oes Mr. Khrushchev's reactions, what-
ever they may be, dissolve us from our rational responsibilities to our-
selves and to the world in this situation? Do not those responsibilities 
require us to explore fully and vigorously any and all avenues of peace 
even as we steel ourselves for wha~ must come if the way to peace cannot 
be found? 
I makes these suggestions, Mr. President, as one Senator from 
the State of Montana. I me.ke them in full recognition of the present 
position of this government which, if it is unchanged, will be my personal 
position when all the words are exhausted. I make them, however, in the 
belief that this present position is not enough, even as the present 
Soviet position is not enough. Our present position on Berlin, even un-
challenged by the Soviet Union, leads only in a circle endlessly repeated 
as it continues to recede from the changing realities of Germany and Europe 
until it now promises to become at best irrelevant and at worst a stimulus 
to catastrophe. The Soviet position on Berlin, unchanged, in my opinion, 
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is also headed towards complete irrelevance unless before that point is 
reached, it precipitates a military conflict by accident or design. 
The implications of what I have tried to say to the Senate, then, 
are clear. Sooner or later, the Western nations and the Soviet Union must 
seek a new way, a third way to solution of the Berlin problem along the 
lines which 1 have suggested or some other. Unless this search is pursued 
with energy and dispatch and to fruition, sooner or later, Berlin is likely 
to become the pivot of a new disaster for mankind. 
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